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IN THE SUPREME CO,UR T

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GIDEON POLLESCHE and
MARIE POLLESCHE,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No.

TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE
COMPANY,
a California corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

12555

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
The plaintiffs brought this action to recover damages from Transamerica Insurance Company under their
policy's uninsured motorist clause, for personal injuries
arising out of a rear end automobile accident on State
Street in Murray, Utah, on Wednesday, December 6,
1967, at 1:04 p.m.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs appeal to this Court from a jury verdict of
No Cause of Action against both the plaintiff driver and
1

..,
plaintiff passenger. Thereafter the trial court denied plain.
tiffs' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the verdict
and Motion for New Trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks aff irmance of the disposition reached by the jury and the court below.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Plaintiffs' statement of the facts is essentially correct regarding the time and place of the accident and the
uninsured status of the adverse driver, Thora G. Patterson. The facts thereafter are in substantial dispute. As
opposed to plaintiffs' statement of the facts, the facts as
developed at trial from defendant's viewpoint are as foJ. ,
lows:

1

1

On December 6, 1967, Mrs. Patterson was proceeding
North on State Street in the inside lane at a speed of ap·
proximately 25 miles per hour. (Tr. 165). She first
observed the Pollesche vehicle somewhere in the vicinity
of the intersection of Vine and State Streets. (Tr. 165).
Her attention was first directed to the Pollesche vehicle
when she observed the driver repeatedly apply his brakes,
causing the rear brake lights to flash. (Tr. 165 ). She ob·
served no cars in front of the Pollesche vehicle and did
not know why the driver was braking. (Tr. 168). No
intersection was apparent since the center line consisted of
an island which would have prevented Pollesche from
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turning left. (Tr. 166). Mrs. Patterson theorized that a
child or dog may have been in front of the Pollesche vehicle causing Pollesche to brake repeatedly and for this
reason did not pass on the right. (Tr. 164-65, 168). When
the vehicles were approximately 20 feet apart (Tr. 171),
and while looking straight ahead (Tr. 164), Mrs. Patterson observed the Pollesche vehicle stop. (Tr. 168, 171).
No hand signal was given. (Tr. 168). Mrs. Patterson then
applied her brakes but was unable to avoid the collision.
(Tr. 166, 171).
After the impact, which caused a slight dent in the
rear of the Pollesche vehicle (Tr. 170), and which was
not severe enough to even throw the Pollesche baby from
a standing position on the front seat between the parents
(Tr. 168-69), the driver, Gideon Pollesche, got out of his
car, observed the damage, returned to the car and spoke
briefly to his wife, who then began to cry and indicate
signs of pain. (Tr. 167). Prior to that conversation, Mrs.
Pollesche had been watching Mrs. Patterson out of the
rear of the Pollesche vehicle with her arm on the seat.
(Tr. 169). Thereafter Mrs. Pollesche was taken by ambulance to the Cottonwood Hospital (Tr. 189), and the
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department made an accident
investigation at the scene. (Tr. 189-90). Mrs. Pollesche
complained of neck and back pain (Tr. 234), was treated
briefly at the hospital and then examined by Dr. Neal
Capel on the same day. (Tr. 234-35). She continued to
complain of pain and discomfort through that month (Tr.
232-39), and Dr. Capel performed a back fusion on Mrs.
Pollesche on January 11, 1968. (Tr. 280).
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Mr. Pollesche similarly complained of back pain as
a result of the accident (Tr. 188, 191), and was examined
by Dr. Capel. (Tr. 192). In August, 1968, Dr. Capel sim.
ilarly performed a back fusion on Mr. Pollesche. (Tr. 203,
267-68). That fusion was broken in a fall at a K-Mart
Store in January, 1969, (Tr. 212) which gave rise to an
industrial claim. (Tr. 217-18).
Both Mr. and Mrs. Pollesche had been involved in
accidents in which they sustained injuries before the date
of this accident. Mr. Pollesche was involved in two auto·
mobile accidents in February, 1966, both of which caused
injuries to his neck and back (Tr. 192, 193, 248), and a
back fusion was eventually performed by Dr. Neal Capel
in February, 1967. (Tr. 194, 248-51). The operation on
Mr. Pollesche in August, 1968, was to correct a failure of
the fusion performed in February, 1967. Dr. Capel assert·
ed at trial that he was of the opinion the accident with
Mrs. Patterson caused the failure. (Tr. 273-74).
Mrs. Pollesche was injured in an automobile accident
with her husband on February 21, 1966, suffering a cervi·
cal sprain and a herniated disc. (Tr. 192, 229, 235, 28384). Her injuries at that time did not necessitate surgery,
but she did wear a back corset. (Tr. 236-37). The oper·
ation of January, 1968, involved a fusion of the lumbar
spine injured in the accident of February, 1966; and in
Dr. Capel's opinion the collision with Mrs. Patterson's
car aggravated the pre-existing injury and prompted the
surgery of January, 1968. (Tr. 282-83). Both Mr. and
Mrs. Pollesche claimed permanent disability traceable to
the Patterson accident and brought this action to recover
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damages. The injury below returned a unanimous verdict
against both plaintiffs, and the court refused to grant a
new trial or judgment in plaintiffs' favor notwithstanding
the verdict. This appeal then ensued.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I:

THE VERDICT BELOW IS SUSTAINED BY THE
EVIDENCE
Pursuant to Rule 59(a) (6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs seek a new trial on the basis of insufficient evidence to justify the general verdict reached below.
The test as to sufficiency in such cases is whether reasonable minds could be convinced by the facts in evidence
which are necessary to support the verdict. Horsley v.
Robinson, 112 Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592, 597 (1947). There
must be an absence of evidence against the prevailing
party below or a decided preponderance thereof in favor
of appellant before the verdict will be set aside. People
v. Swasey, 6 Utah 93, 21 Pac. 400 ( 1889); See also, Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co., 5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P.2d
622, 626 ( 1966); Efco Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, 17
Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615, 617 (1966).
Considering the issues on appeal, the evidence is
viewed most favorably to the prevailing party below, and
all reasonable presumptions are in favor of the validity
of the verdict. Morris v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 140, 356
P.2d 34 (1960); Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Guthrie, 123
Utah 172, 256 P.2d 706 (1953).
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Two issues are presented for consideration under
this point: ( 1) is there sufficient evidence to sustain a
verdict for no liability, and (2) is there sufficient evidence
to sustain a verdict for no damages. Relative to the question of liability, the evidence sustaining the verdict is
that Mrs. Patterson was driving well within the posted
speed limit, was looking straight ahead, continuously observed the plaintiffs' vehicle up until the moment of im.
pact and was traveling at an approximate distance of
twenty feet behind the Pollesche vehicle. She observed
Mr. Pollesche apply the brakes on several occasions for
no apparent reason, and then without warning he stopped,
causing Mrs. Patterson to collide with him. Plaintiffs in·
troduced evidence at trial that Mrs. Patterson had told
the investigating officer that she had looked into her
purse immediately prior to the impact thereby taking her
eyes from the road (Tr. 185), which Mrs. Patterson denied, stating that her purse was knocked to the floor by
the impact and that she was looking straight ahead im·
mediately prior to impact (Tr. 164).

!

1

Plaintiffs rely very heavily on Mrs. Patterson's state·
ment at trial that she was "the cause" of the accident.
The most that can be said for that testimony is that she i
thereby demonstrated her unprejudiced attitude. Plain·
tiffs attempt to establish legal liability on those state·
meats and forget that Mrs. Patterson's negligence must
be the proximate or legal cause of the injury and that
Mr. Pollesche must be free from contributory negligence.
Even though Mrs. Patterson acknowledged having caused ,'
the accident, her testimony is also balanced by her testi·
1
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mony that she had a distinct belief prior to the accident
that the collision was being set up by plaintiffs. She stated
as follows:
But I think that there is about three times that he
did apply his brakes. And I became kind of irritated. I thought, well, why doesn't he either stop
or what is causing him to. I felt like he was calling me to hit him. After I thought about it, it
seemed like he didn't want me to hit him too hard,
but yet he was letting me slow down enough so
that I could hit him and and not do very much
harm to him (emphasis added) (Tr. 172).
Therefore, even though Mrs. Patterson acknowledged
rear-ending plaintiffs' vehicle, she obviously felt no legal
responsibility and the evidence in this regard was evenly
balanced. It could reasonably appear to the jury that Mrs.
Patterson's negligence, if any, was not the proximate cause
of the collision or, if it were, that Mr. Pollesche, the
driver, was contributorily negligent. There was sufficient
evidence if believed by a jury to sustain a finding of no
liability.
Plaintiffs complain that it is impossible to ascertain
whether the jury based their verdicts on no negligence on
the part of Mrs. Patterson or on contributory negligence
of Mr. Pollesche. A general verdict obviously permits no
inquiry into the exact ground for decision; if plaintiffs
had desired a more explicit analysis of the verdict process, they should have requested the case be submitted on
other than a general verdict form; i.e., special interrogatories. Plaintiffs did not seek such at trial and should
now be precluded from complaining about the type of
verdict form.
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On the issue of damages, it is basic law that plaintiffs must prove actual loss or damages proximately flowing from the alleged negligent conduct of Mrs. Patterson
in order to prevail. See, Prosser, Torts, 146 (3rd ed. 1964).
Sufficient evidence exists to support a finding that plaintiffs sustained no damages. The physical evidence at the
scene indicated a relatively insignificant accident. In the
first place, both Mrs. Patterson and the investigating
officer indicated that the impact to the Pollesche vehicle
was minor. Mrs. Patterson testified that the impact left a
dent approximately one and one-half inches deep in Pol·
lesche's vehicle. (Tr. 170), and Officer Weston considered
the accident "relatively minor." (Tr. 182). Mrs. Patterson also testified that the impact was not sufficient to
knock the Pollesche baby from a standing position on
the front seat of the car. (Tr. 169). Not only would the
physical evidence sustain a finding of no damage, plaintiffs' conduct at the scene also supports such a finding.
Mrs. Patterson stated Mrs. Pollesche had her arm on the
back of the seat after the accident and had turned her body
in such a way to look at Mrs. Patterson in her car, and
that Mrs. Pollesche evidenced no pain or emotion until
after her husband had ascertained the damage caused by
the impact and then returned to the car and spoke with
his wife. (Tr. 167, 169). Mr. Pollesche received no cuts
or bruises (Tr. 182), possibly complained of some
pain (Tr. 180), but was not taken to a hospital as was
his wife. He remained at the scene through the entire in·
vestigation and then went to the hospital, not for him·
self, but to see his wife. (Tr. 190). Mrs. Patterson saw Mr.
Pollesche approximately two weeks after the accident and
8

he evidenced no disability in walking up a steep incline
to Mrs. Patterson's house. (Tr. 170).
The medical evidence also indicates a lack of injury
to either plaintiff caused by this accident. As noted above,
Mr. Pollesche had been involved in two prior automobile
accidents, in both of which he claimed injury to his back.
In February, 1967, Dr. Neal Capel performed a lumbar
spinal fusion to correct the injury. As of November 22,
1967, the last time that Dr. Capel saw Mr. Pollesche prior
to the accident, Mr. Pollesche was still complaining of
neck and back pain, soreness and headaches. (Tr. 25152). On the day of the accident involving Mrs. Patterson,
Dr. Capel examined Mr. Pollesche and diagnosed a cervical and low-back sprain based on complaints made by
Mr. Pollesche. (Tr. 256). X-rays were taken, the reading
of which indicated the pre-existing fusion to be intact.
(Tr. 256, 290-91). Dr. Capel noted certain degenerative
changes in the cervical area, but stated these were attributable to the former accident. (Tr. 256, 290-91). On the
basis of his examination, Dr. Capel prescribed traction,
medication and physiotherapy. (Tr. 256-57). During the
next month Mr. Pollesche made constant improvement,
according to Dr. Capel; complaints of pain decreased.
Within two weeks Mr. Pollesche was able to walk four to
five hours a day and was generally feeling better. (Tr.
292-93). On February 12, 1968, Dr. Capel again took
X-rays and ascertained for the first time that the pre-existing fusion had broken. (Tr. 260). This he attributed to
the accident. (Tr. 273-74). The doctor's notes at that
time, however, indicate that the break had occurred "re-
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cently or developed earlier" (Tr. 293-95 ), thereby indi.
eating a rather extensive doubt as to when the break had
in fact occurred. The doubtful origin of the break was
also extended by Dr. Capel's admissions that there is a
normal fusion failure rate of ten to twenty per cent and
that normal wear and tear often results in a break in a
fusion with no trauma involved. (Tr. 297). The break
in this fusion was eventually corrected surgically in August, 1968, and in this regard it is noteworthy that Dr.
Capel gave Mr. Pollesche the same disability rating after
the second fusion as after the first, indicating little likelihood of aggravation by this accident. (Tr. 299-300).
The medical evidence presented at trial therefore re·
veals considerable doubt as to whether Mr. Pollesche actu·
ally suffered compensable injuries in this accident. His
conduct at the scene, his steady improvement after the
accident, and the uncertainty as to when the break in the
fusion actually occurred, considered together with the
fact that Mr. Pollesche complained of no injuries different
from those he had suffered previously would all be suffi.
dent to sustain a finding by the jury that no injury was
traceable to the accident.
The evidence linking Mrs. Pollesche's injury to this
accident is even more attenuated. The question of causa·
tion is raised by the sudden onset of her pain at the scene
and is compounded by the fact that the nurses' notes at
the hospital indicate that Mrs. Pollesche complained of
headaches and pain in the cervical area but not in the
back. (Tr. 302-03). As noted above, Mrs. Pollesche was
involved in a prior automobile accident on February 22,
10

1967, in which she suffered a cervical sprain (Tr. 283-84)
and a herniated disc in her lower back. (Tr. 287, 283). Dr.
Capel treated Mrs. Pollesche intermittently for her back
problems and asserted that immediately prior to this accident she had reached a "plateau" where she was still experiencing pain and discomfort incident to the back injury,
and that corrective surgery was probable in order to eliminate the problem. In his opinion, the problem was
chronic. (Tr. 276, 285-86). Dr. Capel saw Mrs. Pollesche
on the day of the accident and diagnosed her condition as
a cervical sprain with muscle spasms and a low-back
sprain superimposed on the pre-existing disc lesion. (Tr.
278). The herniated disc in the lumbar region was eventually removed and a fusion performed on January 11,
1968. (Tr. 280). Dr. Capel was of the opinion the accident
December 6, 1967, had aggravated the pre existing lumbar back condition (Tr. 283), and that it also aggravated
the pre-existing cervical sprain from the 1966 accident.
(Tr. 283-84). His notes taken from the initial examination
with Mrs. Pollesche on the date of this accident are consistent with those of the nurses at the hospital in establishing that Mrs. Pollesche's major source of pain at that
time was in the neck, not in the lower back. Those notes,
read into the record, were as follows:
The automobile that she was riding in was struck
from the rear. She believes that this accident did
not materially affect the low back but seemed to be
more productive of neck sprain and neck discomfort and stiffness and soreness. Since the December
6, 1967, accident the low back has been essentially
the same as it had been the month before. (Tr.
287).
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In a prior medical report Dr. Capel had asserted that the
former accident was responsible for the surgery in January, 1968, and this was confirmed at trial under crossexamination when he stated by far the major injury to the
back had been caused by the prior accident.
The weight of the evidence on Mrs. Pollesche's injuries is that she suffered no injury to her lower back and
that no aggravation occurred. There is substantial evidence that the alleged injury to the cervical spine was
feigned, and could have been so believed by the jury.
Again, as with Mr. Pollesche, the injuries allegedly suffered were no different in degree or kind than those .mffered by her in the previous accident. The jury could
have easily believed on the basis of the evidence presented that no injury, in fact, occurred.
POINT

II:

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Defendant incorporates herein the argument set forth
above under Point I. It is established law that the granting or the refusing of a motion for new trial based on in·
sufficiency of evidence is largely within the discretion of
the trial court. See Moser tJ, Z.C.M.I., 114 Utah 58, 197
P.2d 136 (1948); Reynolds v. W. W. Clyde & Co., 5 Utah
2d 151, 298 P.2d 530 (1956). This is so for the obvious
reason the trial judge was physically present in the court·
room to evaluate the witnesses and the evidence as it came
10. The lower court here has had an opportunity to set
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aside the judgment if it believed all the circumstances
warranted such action, but has declined to do so. Considering the evidence supporting the verdict in this case, together with the fact the verdict was unanimous, the lower
court has not abused its discretion and should be sustained
in denying plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, in considering the evidence as a whole
as plaintiffs suggest in their brief, as the court should do,
legally sufficient evidence appears to justify the verdict
reached below on either of two grounds: ( 1) no fault or
(2) no loss. The substantiating evidence comes not only
from Mrs. Patterson, but also from plaintiffs' own witness, Dr. Capel. The trial court was not only aware of
all the evidence, but was able to evaluate it in light of
other intangible factors as it was introduced. Based on
the sufficiency of the evidence in the record, the court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial
or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Based on the foregoing, defendant respectfully submits the action of the court and jury below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted
REX J. HANSON, and
P. KEITH NELSON
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent
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